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Abstract This research extends literature that empirically evaluates the
impact of ownership and management structure on property level
performance. The results show that multifamily properties owned
and managed by real estate investment trusts (REITs) generate
higher effective rents at the property level than non-REIT-owned
properties. After controlling for positive operating scale and
brand effects, REIT property level performance is better than
non-REIT property level performance in the market studied. The
REIT structure represents diversiﬁed scale operators with
property management skills. The results imply that the structure
of property ownership can impact property performance.
Current studies postulate that property ownership and management structure
impact real property investment performance. Operating revenues, cash ﬂows, and
appreciation returns are thought to be affected by the management ability and the
acquisition and disposition tactics employed by a property’s owner. This research
deviates from the historical view that each property is a unique, stand-alone asset
with little direct beneﬁt associated with ownership or management structure. The
prior construct may not remain uniformly valid given the tremendous growth in
large, integrated, scale owners and managers. Many studies document the beneﬁts
associated with property portfolio diversiﬁcation, especially by geography and
property type, and the implied scale economies that support a real estate
investment trust’s (REIT’s), or any large diversiﬁed investor’s, ability to generate
a higher return with reduced portfolio level risk. Few studies, however, focus on
the impact of ownership structure and investor clienteles at the property level.
Benjamin, Chinloy, and Hardin (2006) document the positive impact associated
with the use of a branding strategy at the property level. This strategy requires
management of real property assets in a long-term, coordinated manner. The cost
of branding must be offset by gains over an entire portfolio and the ownership
structure must be sufﬁciently broad and over a sufﬁcient duration to capture these
gains. Such a strategy is not consistent with a property trading, short-term286  Hardin, Hill, and Hopper
investment orientation, but instead requires a long-term investment horizon. In a
concurrent study, Benjamin, Chinloy, and Hardin (2007) show that operational
scale is a signiﬁcant determinant of effective rents. Scale operators in a speciﬁc
market can generate higher effective rents at the property level. These operators
are better able to obtain market information and to signal property quality. In a
study focused on REIT-owned lodging properties, Brady and Conlin (2004),
however, ﬁnd little or no support for the argument that the REIT ownership
structure alone increases property performance. For lodging properties, property
type and quality represented by hotel ﬂag, or brand, have a greater inﬂuence on
performance than REIT ownership. While not supportive of the REIT managerial
effectiveness argument, Brady and Conlin do show that property performance is
related to the quality of a lodging property, which can be signaled by its ﬂag or
brand. It remains difﬁcult to refute that ownership, management, and marketing
structure can at times impact property performance as measured by revenue and
costs at the property level.
The present research expands this growing literature by evaluating the performance
of REIT-owned multifamily properties. Motels and hotels are typically managed
by true third party management ﬁrms and are supported by coordinated marketing
efforts under a brand or ﬂag. Multifamily properties are primarily marketed within
a single market and branding is not the predominant strategy. The paper directly
extends Brady and Conlin’s (2004) investigation of the performance of REIT-
owned lodging properties to an additional property type. Concurrently, existing
studies focused on ownership characteristics, operating performance, and portfolio
construction are broadened by providing empirical justiﬁcation for a willingness
by certain investor clienteles to pay premiums for property acquisitions. By
generating greater property-level revenue, investors with operating skills can
generate equivalent returns despite payment of an acquisition premium.
The study ﬁndings indicate that REIT-owned apartment properties in the Atlanta
market generate higher effective rents than comparable non-REIT-owned
properties for the period studied. Even after controlling for operational scale,
branding, and property characteristics, REIT-owned properties perform better at
the property level in this market. Given an assumption that REIT managers in
aggregate acquire real estate skills and own large geographically diversiﬁed
portfolios, the ﬁndings conﬁrm expectations of a maturing industry. The study
also provides a partial explanation for the REIT acquisition premium shown in
prior literature and highlights the importance of investor clienteles in the
management and ownership of income-producing real property. The need to
continue to expand existing research on the determinants of operating level
performance to property ownership and management characteristics is manifested.
Data and analysis from additional property types and geographical areas are still
needed to identify whether the results are applicable across real estate markets.
 The Relevant Literature
Two current areas of the literature are relevant. Research has documented clientele
and ownership characteristics that impact property acquisition price. ConcomitantOwnership Structure, Property Performance  287
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research has also documented that property operating performance can be
impacted by owners, managers, and investment strategies. This study links
property acquisition research showing that REITs have, at times, paid premiums
for property acquisitions with literature showing that ownership characteristics can
inﬂuence property operating performance. The willingness and ability to pay a
property acquisition premium implies either a lower cost of total capital, the ability
to better manage real property assets, or some combination of these two factors.
Participant characteristics and investor clienteles have been shown to impact real
estate transaction prices. In residential real estate, numerous studies indicate that
individual participant characteristics affect transaction price. For example,
Harding, Rosenthal, and Sirmans (2003) investigate bargaining power and
determine that both ﬁrst-time home buyers and search-constrained home buyers
pay higher prices. Zumpano, Elder, and Baryla (1996) show that residential buyers
with low opportunity costs and limited market knowledge have prolonged property
searches. Jud and Frew (1986) and Turnbull and Sirmans (1993) investigate local
and non-local participants in the residential markets with mixed results. Non-local
residential buyers will, on occasion, pay property acquisition premiums. In the
residential property market, transaction party groups have been shown to impact
transaction price.1
Contemporaneous with these studies is research evaluating investor clienteles and
commercial real estate. In a study of ofﬁce property transactions, Colwell and
Munneke (2006) show that buyers working with banks often pay more for ofﬁce
properties and sell these properties for less than other market participants. They
postulate that bargaining strength impacts transaction price. With respect to REIT
participation in commercial real estate transactions, Hardin and Wolverton (1996)
and Lambson, McQueen, and Slade (2004) provide evidence that apartment REITs
can affect transaction prices. Hardin and Wolverton ﬁnd that REITs at times pay
a premium for acquisitions in some markets, including Atlanta and Phoenix, but
not in all markets. A willingness on the part of REITs to pay premiums is
attributed to capital market conditions at the time of the study, to differences in
capital costs between buyers, and to scale economies for REITs. Lambson,
McQueen, and Slade show that non-local buyers pay more than locals and that
REITs paid a purchase premium in the Phoenix market during the period
investigated. The behavior of non-local buyers is explained by limited effective
search and bias associated with the anchoring heuristic. An alternative explanation
could be that local buyers need to be compensated for holding an undiversiﬁed
portfolio. Benjamin, Chinloy, Hardin, and Wu (2008) investigate investor
clienteles and show that condo converters can lead an upward trend in apartment
pricing while paying premiums over investors acquiring property for cash ﬂow.
In all cases, identiﬁable commercial market participants, or clienteles, affect
transaction prices.
Additional research shows that ownership structure and strategy affect property
level operating performance measured by operating costs and revenues. In a study
of the operating performance of lodging properties owned by REITs, Brady and
Conlin (2004) show that REIT ownership in isolation does not positively impact288  Hardin, Hill, and Hopper
operating performance. After controlling for ﬂag or brand, lodging type, and
location, REIT-owned property performance is undifferentiated when compared
with non-REIT-owned property performance. Benjamin, Chinloy, and Hardin
(2006) investigate the ability of property owners to brand their properties and earn
higher operating results. Scale operators with local management are more likely
to employ the branding strategy and generate excess property returns as measured
by effective gross rental income. The implication is that ownership strategy, as
evidenced by branding, impacts operating results. In a subsequent study focused
on scale and institutional ownership, Benjamin, Chinloy, and Hardin (2007) show
that operators with local management and scale in a speciﬁc market can generate
improved operating performance. These studies support the general argument that
ownership characteristics affect actual property performance.
In the present study, the REIT form of ownership is evaluated in the context of
improved property operating performance. The study extends the ownership-
clientele research stream by quantifying an operating beneﬁt that might induce an
investor group to pay an acquisition premium and to show that economies of scale,
as proposed by Ambrose, Linneman, and Highﬁeld (2005), which are most often
associated with cost savings, may also be associated with enhanced rents and
income. This implies both top line and bottom line improvements to investment
returns at the operating level based on ownership structure.
 Model Specification and Data
Benjamin, Chinloy, and Hardin (2007) propose a property rent and occupancy
model that is based on both hedonic property characteristics and property owner
characteristics. Rent and occupancy are a function of more than simple hedonic
characteristics. Properties owned by differentiated investor and owner clienteles
can be modeled in a multivariate format using both hedonic and property
ownership characteristics. Accordingly, two models are employed. Similar to
Benjamin, Chinloy, and Hardin (2006, 2007), the ﬁrst model is a probit model
with classiﬁcation as a REIT property being the dependent variable of interest.
The general form of the model is:
REIT P  ƒ(o, , ), (1)
where PREIT is a dichotomous variable for the classiﬁcation of a property as a
REIT-owned property, o is a vector of ownership and management variables,  is
a vector of hedonic property characteristic variables, and  is a vector of location
and time control variables. The second model is also similar to those employed
by Benjamin, Chinloy, and Hardin (2006, 2007) where the dependent variables
are occupancy rate and the natural log of rent. Given that the residuals from the
last equation are likely to be contemporaneously correlated, these equations are
evaluated using the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) methodology. TheOwnership Structure, Property Performance  289
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models of occupancy and vacancy are similar to Equation 1 and are represented
in the equations that follow:
Rent  ƒ(, o, , ), and (2)
Occ  ƒ(, o, , ) (3)
where Rent is the log of per unit rent, Occ is the multifamily complex occupancy
rate, o is a vector of ownership and management variables,  is a vector of hedonic
property characteristic variables, and  is a vector of location and time control
variables. Additionally, based on the results from the estimated probit models,
inverse Mill’s ratios are calculated and are used to control for possible endogeneity
of the REIT variable.2
The data used in the models are generated from apartment rental data provided
by Databank, Inc. In order to be included in the analysis, a property must have a
minimum of 150 units. This restricts the sample to properties that are sufﬁciently
large to attract institutional and other large investors. Pooled longitudinal data for
twenty quarters ending with March, 2001 on 470 properties forms the basis of
the evaluation. The data include property characteristics, rental information,
occupancy rate, ownership, and location attributes. Atlanta is regarded as a top-
tier investment market for both institutional and non-institutional investors.
 Empirical Results
Exhibit 1 provides descriptive statistics for the complete sample while Exhibit
2 disaggregates the data into REIT and non-REIT properties and provides
comparisons. Exhibit 1 shows little evidence that amenities differs by unit property
type.3 The majority of properties have pools, ﬁtness centers, and social facilities.
About half have playgrounds and about 25% have business centers. A smaller
percentage of properties have controlled access and covered parking. The
occupancy rate across unit types is undifferentiated and there is little difference
in the location and age variables. The ownership and management structure
variables are also similar across the property unit types. As expected, the size and
rent variables increase monotonically from the one-bedroom to the two-bedroom
and three-bedroom units.
Exhibit 2 provides summary descriptive statistics disaggregated by REIT and non-
REIT ownership status with statistical comparisons. The REIT-owned properties
generate greater rents than non-REIT properties across all unit types. The
differences in rents are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Occupancy rates
are also statistically signiﬁcant (at the 1% level) and higher for REIT-owned
properties, although the differences appear to have little practical effect. The REIT-

























Exhibit 1  Descriptive Statistics
One-Bedroom Units Two-Bedroom Units Three-Bedroom Units
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
REIT 21.469 41.064 22.380 41.683 20.128 40.101
Unit Rents (dollars) 607.533 122.475 728.565 161.520 865.475 243.946
Occupancy Rate 95.331 5.112 95.274 5.153 94.918 5.678
Branded 16.186 36.836 15.458 36.154 12.125 32.646
Age (years) 17.679 8.814 17.963 8.808 19.339 9.347
Number of Units in Complex 321.460 163.229 311.649 140.398 310.086 133.435
Average Size of Unit (sq. feet) 783.664 97.109 1,110.250 129.063 1,373.490 170.888
Local Control 53.222 49.901 52.481 49.943 55.166 49.739
Number Controlled 7.485 8.341 7.189 8.062 6.952 7.626
Local Management 81.248 39.037 80.309 39.770 84.020 36.647
Number Managed 11.138 10.385 10.856 10.255 10.232 9.796
Latitude 33.872 11.892 33.870 0.121 33.866 0.121
Longitude 84.357 0.139 84.354 13.686 84.363 13.598
Pool 96.347 18.762 96.600 18.126 96.092 19.381
Covered Parking 14.444 35.156 13.844 34.540 12.286 32.832
Laundry 90.764 28.956 90.267 29.643 92.184 26.846
Fitness Center 62.439 48.433 61.225 48.728 59.690 49.059
Social Facility 69.408 46.084 69.205 46.168 67.532 46.832































































Exhibit 1  (continued)
Descriptive Statistics
One-Bedroom Units Two-Bedroom Units Three-Bedroom Units
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Playground 47.414 49.938 47.935 49.962 50.990 49.997
Gated/Controlled Access 19.820 39.868 19.500 39.624 17.077 37.636
In-Unit Alarms 14.331 35.042 14.503 35.217 12.259 32.801
Both Security Measures 18.247 38.626 18.373 38.729 16.783 37.376
Notes: Exhibit 1 displays the descriptive statistics for the present analysis once the sample is differentiated by property unit type. The apartment unit type
samples are derived from 470 apartment complexes of more than 150 units in the Atlanta MSA. There are 20 quarters of data. The last quarter of data is
from the ﬁrst quarter of 2001. REIT, Branded, Local Control, Local Management, Pool, Covered Parking, Laundry, Fitness Center, Social Facility, Business
Center, Playground, Gated/Controlled Access, In-Unit Alarms,a n dBoth Security Measures are indicator variables equaling one if the apartment unit has
the given characteristic, otherwise zero. The aforementioned variables plus Occupancy Rate are reported in percentage form. The units for the remaining

























Exhibit 2  A Comparison of REIT and Non-REIT Properties
One-Bedroom Units Two-Bedroom Units Three-Bedroom Units
Variable REIT Non-REIT t-stat. REIT Non-REIT t-stat. REIT Non-REIT t-stat.
Unit Rents (dollars) 677.706 588.350 21.96*** 845.860 694.745 27.43*** 1,070.160 813.892 19.85***
Occupancy Rate 95.734 95.221 3.66*** 95.749 95.137 4.59*** 95.508 94.770 3.77***
Branded 41.710 9.208 21.33*** 40.310 8.292 22.44*** 39.495 5.228 18.73***
Age (years) 13.271 18.884 23.10*** 13.492 19.252 24.89*** 13.487 20.814 20.87***
# of Units in Complex 374.201 307.041 9.88*** 351.551 300.143 11.36*** 348.491 300.407 8.27***
Ave. Unit Size (sq. ft.) 771.313 787.041 6.35*** 1,129.980 1,104.570 7.08*** 1,359.620 1,376.990 2.66***
Local Control 62.478 50.692 7.12*** 59.612 50.425 5.84*** 61.303 53.619 3.79***
Number Controlled 16.517 5.016 34.82*** 15.995 4.650 36.44*** 15.423 4.817 25.94***
Local Management 73.037 83.492 7.30*** 71.783 82.767 7.99*** 77.260 85.724 5.10***
Number Managed 17.478 9.404 20.94 17.162 9.037 22.20*** 17.041 8.516 17.88***
Latitude 33.895 33.866 8.89*** 33.895 33.862 10.24*** 33.892 33.859 8.12***
Longitude 84.354 84.358 0.94 84.351 84.355 1.08 84.373 84.361 2.26**
Pool 97.295 96.088 2.14** 97.442 96.357 2.08** 97.473 95.744 2.54**
Covered Parking 25.654 11.379 10.34*** 26.357 10.237 12.32*** 26.330 8.747 10.41***
Laundry 94.590 89.719 5.96*** 93.178 89.428 4.47*** 98.936 90.483 12.91***
Fitness Center 68.150 60.879 4.51*** 69.070 58.963 6.82*** 73.138 56.300 9.08***
Social Facility 68.499 69.656 0.75 69.225 69.200 0.02 71.277 66.588 2.46**
Business Center 22.339 24.451 1.48 24.031 24.519 0.36 15.957 23.995 5.19***































































Exhibit 2  (continued)
A Comparison of REIT and Non-REIT Properties
One-Bedroom Units Two-Bedroom Units Three-Bedroom Units
Variable REIT Non-REIT t-stat. REIT Non-REIT t-stat. REIT Non-REIT t-stat.
Gated/Controlled Access 25.218 18.344 4.86*** 26.279 17.546 6.46*** 21.010 16.086 3.02***
In-Unit Alarms 10.820 15.291 4.17*** 11.938 15.244 3.15*** 12.367 12.232 0.10
Both Security Measures 21.204 17.438 2.81*** 21.240 17.546 2.90*** 27.527 14.075 7.69***
# of Observations 1,146 4,192 1,290 4,474 752 2,984
Notes: Exhibit 2 displays the summary statistics once the sample is differentiated by REIT and Non-REIT properties as well as property unit type. The
apartment unit type samples are derived from 470 apartment complexes of more than 150 units in the Atlanta MSA. There are twenty quarters of data. The
last quarter of data is from the ﬁrst quarter of 2001. Branded, Local Control, Local Management, Pool, Covered Parking, Laundry, Fitness Center, Social
Facility, Business Center, Playground, Gated/Controlled Access, In-Unit Alarms,a n dBoth Security Measures are indicator variables equaling one if the
apartment unit has the given characteristic, otherwise zero. The aforementioned variables plus Occupancy Rate are reported in percentage form. The units
for the remaining variables are listed in the exhibit. t-statistics are for differences in means for the variables.
* Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.294  Hardin, Hill, and Hopper
units in complex variable comparisons. The unit size variables show that the REIT-
owned properties have slightly smaller one-bedroom and three-bedroom units and
slightly larger two bedroom units. REIT-owned properties are managed and
controlled by scale operators and have a slightly smaller percentage of local
management than non-REIT properties. REIT-owned properties are more likely to
use a branding strategy and are also more likely to have a higher level amenity
package than non-REIT properties as differences in means for the variables are
statistically signiﬁcant and positive. REIT-owned properties are less likely to
provide playground amenities and typically offer more sophisticated access and
security amenities than non-REIT properties. These relationships are formally
evaluated using the probit model results presented in Exhibit 3.
Exhibit 3 provides the results from the probit model with classiﬁcation as a REIT
as the dependent variable. The reported Z-statistics are calculated with robust
standard errors. Overall, the results are robust across the unit property type models
and the three location models. The three location models include different controls
for location effects. Models One, Two, and Three use longitude and latitude
coordinates, county indicator variables, and sub-markets indicator variables,
respectively.4 Using a branding strategy and controlling a large number of
properties are positively and statistically signiﬁcantly (at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels) associated with REIT ownership. As might be expected given that REIT
headquarters are geographically disbursed and not centered in Atlanta, being
locally controlled and managed is negatively related to REIT ownership at the 1%
level. REIT-owned properties are newer than non-REIT properties as the age
variable is negative and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level across all models.
REIT ownership is positively associated with larger apartment complexes and
negatively associated with unit size. The pool amenity variable is positive and
statistically signiﬁcant across the one-bedroom and two-bedroom models. The
playground variable is negatively signed and statistically signiﬁcant at either the
5% or 1% level across the models. Similar patterns are found for the in-unit alarm
and having both in-unit alarms and controlled access variables. The coefﬁcients
on the both security measure variable for each model, however, tend to be positive
and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level. This last hedonic variable
is demonstrative of an integrated security system. In the three location models,
there is evidence of a spatial differentiation in the location of REIT properties.
The use of the three different models using different measures of location provides
robustness to the overall results. Overall, REIT-owned properties can be segmented
by both organizational and hedonic characteristics.
The results for the SURs of occupancy and the per unit log of rent are provided
in Exhibits 4–6. The exhibits provide the results from the three location models.
The appropriateness of the SUR methodology for these data is tested using a
Breusch-Pagan (1980) LM test. For the one-bedroom models in Exhibit 4, the
calculated test statistic has a p-value of 0.0481, indicating that the SUR
methodology will produce more precise estimates than that estimated by ordinary































































Exhibit 3  Probit Model Used to Estimate Factors Associated with REIT Status
Location Model One Location Model Two Location Model Three
Variable 1 Bedroom 2 Bedroom 3 Bedroom 1 Bedroom 2 Bedroom 3 Bedroom 1 Bedroom 2 Bedroom 3 Bedroom
Intercept 35.483** 31.174* 73.232*** 1.848*** 0.570** 2.363*** 2.557*** 1.033*** 2.646***
Branded 0.179** 0.241*** 0.501*** 0.151* 0.229*** 0.511*** 0.176** 0.194** 0.653***
Age (years) 0.039*** 0.043*** 0.045*** 0.043*** 0.048*** 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.060*** 0.075***
#o fU n i t s 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000* 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000
Ave Unit Size (sf.) 0.001*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.001** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000 0.000 0.002***
Local Control 0.234*** 0.357*** 0.768*** 0.207*** 0.341*** 0.774*** 0.192** 0.376*** 0.970***
Number Controlled 0.116*** 0.126*** 0.120*** 0.115*** 0.125*** 0.117*** 0.113*** 0.126*** 0.119***
Local Management 0.682*** 0.698*** 0.600*** 0.763*** 0.779*** 0.695*** 0.836*** 0.869*** 0.817***
Number Managed 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.011** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.012** 0.009* 0.007 0.007
Latitude 0.618*** 0.473** 1.068***
Longitude 0.152 0.173 0.465**
Pool 0.429*** 0.436*** 0.000 0.551*** 0.579*** 0.194 0.405*** 0.484*** 0.065
Covered Parking 0.075 0.029 0.498*** 0.096 0.004 0.440*** 0.061 0.006 0.417***
Laundry 0.286*** 0.191** 1.285*** 0.261*** 0.146* 1.135*** 0.343*** 0.125 1.152***
Fitness Center 0.097* 0.132** 0.014 0.107** 0.139*** 0.049 0.114** 0.193*** 0.146*
Social Facility 0.129** 0.108** 0.152** 0.116** 0.106** 0.203*** 0.060 0.020 0.096
Business Center 0.024 0.071 0.350*** 0.023 0.069 0.366*** 0.037 0.068 0.363***
Playground 0.116** 0.124*** 0.537*** 0.123** 0.139*** 0.537*** 0.115** 0.117** 0.614***
Gated/Controlled
Access

























Exhibit 3  (continued)
Probit Model Used to Estimate Factors Associated with REIT Status
Location Model One Location Model Two Location Model Three
Variable 1 Bedroom 2 Bedroom 3 Bedroom 1 Bedroom 2 Bedroom 3 Bedroom 1 Bedroom 2 Bedroom 3 Bedroom
In-Unit Alarms 0.144** 0.083 0.140 0.124* 0.084 0.153 0.248*** 0.110 0.320***
Both Security
Measures
0.132* 0.149** 0.236*** 0.123* 0.156** 0.257*** 0.044 0.039 0.223**
N 5,338 5,764 3,736 5,338 5,764 3,736 5,338 5,764 3,736
Log-Likelihood 1,697.182 1,823.235 1,049.897 1,686.763 1,804.158 1,036.003 1,577.731 1,699.102 908.573
Psuedo R2 0.389 0.405 0.440 0.392 0.411 0.448 0.432 0.445 0.515
Notes: The dependent variable, REIT, is a binary variable equaling one if the ﬁrm-year observation has elected REIT status, otherwise zero. Branded, Local
Control, Local Management, Pool, Covered Parking, Laundry, Fitness Center, Social Facility, Business Center, Playground, Gated/Controlled Access, In-Unit
Alarms, Both Security Measures are indicator variables equaling one if the apartment unit has the given characteristic, otherwise zero. The units for the
remaining variables are deﬁned as before. The probit equation is estimated separately for one, two, and three bedroom units. Three models are presented:
location effects controlled with Latitude and Longitude; location effects using indicator variables by county (the variables are unreported, but consistent); and,
location effects using indicator variables for twenty-one submarkets (the variables are unreported, but consistent). Each model includes annual indicator
variables. The Z-statistics are calculated with robust standard errors.
* Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.































































Exhibit 4  Location Model 1: SUR Results
1 Bedroom 2 Bedroom 3 Bedroom
Occupancy Ln Rent Occupancy Ln Rent Occupancy Ln Rent
Intercept 1.151** 5.132*** 1.112** 8.736*** 0.209 9.034***
REIT 0.006*** 0.052*** 0.006*** 0.057*** 0.004 0.098***
Branded 0.002 0.073*** 0.002 0.051*** 0.003 0.086***
Age (years) 0.000 0.011*** 0.000*** 0.012*** 0.001*** 0.012***
# of Units (100’s) 0.003*** 0.007*** 0.003*** 0.003** 0.005*** 0.003
Unit Size (1,000s sf) 0.029*** 0.038*** 0.031*** 0.395*** 0.039*** 0.154***
Local Control 0.001 0.061*** 0.000 0.071*** 0.005 0.074***
Number Controlled 0.000 0.005*** 0.000 0.008*** 0.000 0.007***
Latitude 0.010 0.394*** 0.011* 0.407*** 0.006 0.529***
Longitude 0.002 0.023* 0.002 0.014 0.017** 0.027
Pool 0.018*** 0.040*** 0.017*** 0.049*** 0.022*** 0.023*
Covered Parking 0.002 0.007 0.003 0.018*** 0.006* 0.049***
Laundry 0.002 0.022*** 0.002 0.007 0.003 0.086***
Fitness Center 0.005*** 0.015*** 0.000 0.018*** 0.002 0.034***
Social Facility 0.002 0.010** 0.000 0.017*** 0.002 0.026***
Business Center 0.001 0.012*** 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.019***
Playground 0.004*** 0.029*** 0.004*** 0.040*** 0.002 0.075***
Gated/Cont. Access 0.002 0.017*** 0.002 0.014*** 0.001 0.018**

























Exhibit 4  (continued)
Location Model 1: SUR Results
1 Bedroom 2 Bedroom 3 Bedroom
Occupancy Ln Rent Occupancy Ln Rent Occupancy Ln Rent
Both Sec. Measures 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.005* 0.019***
Inverse Mill’s Ratio 0.002 0.047*** 0.000 0.071*** 0.005 0.063***
Adj. R2 0.034 0.645 0.037 0.683 0.041 0.654
Notes: The log of rent and complex occupancy rate are the dependent variables. Each property unit type is modeled separately. The temporal quarterly
dummy control variables which show an upward trend for the period are not reported. The model used to estimate the results controls for location effects
using Latitude and Longitude. For the 1 Bedroom, N  5,338; for the 2 Bedroom, N  5,764; and for the 3 Bedroom, N  3,736.
* Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.































































Exhibit 5  Location Model 2: SUR Results
1 Bedroom 2 Bedroom 3 Bedroom
Occupancy Ln Rent Occupancy Ln Rent Occupancy Ln Rent
Intercept 0.969*** 6.304*** 0.982*** 6.330*** 0.999*** 6.634***
REIT 0.006*** 0.052*** 0.007*** 0.057*** 0.005 0.100***
Branded 0.003 0.060*** 0.002 0.043*** 0.002 0.083***
Age (years) 0.000 0.011*** 0.000*** 0.014*** 0.001*** 0.013***
# of Units (100’s) 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.005*** 0.001
Unit Size (1,000s sf) 0.035*** 0.367*** 0.032*** 0.372*** 0.044*** 0.179***
Local Control 0.002 0.056*** 0.002 0.072*** 0.007** 0.069***
Number Controlled 0.000 0.004*** 0.000 0.007*** 0.001** 0.006***
Pool 0.017*** 0.044*** 0.015*** 0.057*** 0.020*** 0.017
Covered Parking 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.013*** 0.006* 0.036***
Laundry 0.004 0.027*** 0.004 0.013** 0.006 0.061***
Fitness Center 0.005*** 0.016*** 0.003* 0.020*** 0.004 0.039***
Social Facility 0.003* 0.010*** 0.001 0.020*** 0.003 0.037***
Business Center 0.000 0.015*** 0.001 0.007* 0.002 0.022***

























Exhibit 5  (continued)
Location Model 2: SUR Results
1 Bedroom 2 Bedroom 3 Bedroom
Occupancy Ln Rent Occupancy Ln Rent Occupancy Ln Rent
Gated/Cont. Access 0.000 0.005 0.002 0.008* 0.002 0.043***
In-Unit Alarms 0.000 0.032*** 0.000 0.042*** 0.008** 0.025***
Both Sec. Measures 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.020***
Inverse Mill’s Ratio 0.001 0.037*** 0.001 0.066*** 0.008** 0.059***
Adj. R2 0.042 0.668 0.042 0.700 0.048 0.658
Notes: The log of rent and complex occupancy rate are the dependent variables. Each property unit type is modeled separately. The temporal quarterly
dummy control variables which show an upward trend for the period are not reported. They show a statistically signiﬁcant upward trend in rents for the
period studied. Model 2 controls for location effects using indicator variables for county, although they are unreported. Data from six counties are used. For
the 1 Bedroom, N  5,338; for the 2 Bedroom, N  5,764; and for the 3 Bedroom, N  3,736.
* Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.































































Exhibit 6  Location Model 3: SUR Results
1 Bedroom 2 Bedroom 3 Bedroom
Occupancy Ln Rent Occupancy Ln Rent Occupancy Ln Rent
Intercept 0.990*** 6.169*** 0.999*** 6.244*** 1.024*** 6.492***
REIT 0.006*** 0.039*** 0.008*** 0.044*** 0.007** 0.065***
Branded 0.002 0.062*** 0.005* 0.046*** 0.001 0.095***
Age (years) 0.000* 0.010*** 0.000 0.013*** 0.000 0.014***
# of Units (100’s) 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003** 0.005*** 0.007***
Unit Size (1,000s sf) 0.040*** 0.377*** 0.033*** 0.353*** 0.040*** 0.155***
Local Control 0.001 0.048*** 0.001 0.065*** 0.006 0.077***
# Controlled 0.000 0.002*** 0.000 0.005*** 0.000 0.005***
Pool 0.006 0.030*** 0.005 0.021** 0.002 0.006
Covered Parking 0.000 0.013*** 0.001 0.019*** 0.002 0.041***
Laundry 0.004 0.035*** 0.004* 0.019*** 0.001 0.057***
Fitness Center 0.007*** 0.006* 0.004*** 0.005 0.003 0.015**
Social Facility 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
Business Center 0.002 0.015*** 0.002 0.007** 0.001 0.019***

























Exhibit 6  (continued)
Location Model 3: SUR Results
1 Bedroom 2 Bedroom 3 Bedroom
Occupancy Ln Rent Occupancy Ln Rent Occupancy Ln Rent
Gated/Cont. Access 0.002 0.010** 0.003 0.011** 0.003 0.011*
In-Unit Alarms 0.003 0.034*** 0.003 0.039*** 0.006* 0.047***
Both Sec. Measures 0.000 0.007* 0.000 0.004 0.006** 0.010
Inverse Mill’s Ratio 0.002 0.017*** 0.001 0.038*** 0.003 0.047***
Adj. R2 0.075 0.715 0.071 0.757 0.080 0.731
Notes: The log of rent and complex occupancy rate are the dependent variables. Each property unit type is modeled separately. The temporal quarterly
dummy control variables which show an upward trend for the period are not reported. They show a statistically signiﬁcant upward trend in rents for the
period studied. Model 3 controls for location using data from twenty-one submarkets, although they are unreported. Data from six counties are used. For the
1 Bedroom, N  5,338; for the 2 Bedroom, N  5,764; and for the 3 Bedroom, N  3,736.
* Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
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models and ranges from 0.034 to 0.041 for the occupancy rate models, which
indicates that the occupancy models are not as well speciﬁed as the log of rent
models.
The primary variable of interest is the REIT variable, which is statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level and positive in the per unit log of rent models across
all three unit types. The REIT variable is also positive and generally statistically
signiﬁcant in the occupancy models. For the Model 1 results using latitude and
longitude coordinates as controls for location or geographical effects, the
coefﬁcient on the REIT variable ranges from 0.052 for the one-bedroom equation
to 0.098 for the three-bedroom equation. As was shown in Benjamin, Chinloy,
and Hardin (2006), the branding variable is positive and statistically signiﬁcant,
indicating that strategic management can impact operating performance by
increasing effective gross income. The local control and number controlled
variable results are intuitive. The beneﬁt to local control goes to larger operators.
Small local operators do not beneﬁt just for being local. This property unit type
has greater variability in amenities and age than the other property unit types and
is less typical in the market. The Inverse Mills Ratio is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level in all the log of rent models.
The hedonic determinants of occupancy and rent are as generally expected. Per
unit log of rent is positively correlated at the 1% level of signiﬁcance with unit
size in all rent models. In the occupancy models, there is a negative relationship
with size. Age, which is a proxy for depreciation and obsolescence, is negative
and signiﬁcant at the 1% level across the three rent models. The playground
variable is negative and signiﬁcant across the rent models at the 1% level. In two
of the three occupancy models, the variable is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1%
level. Apartment complexes that provide playground facilities may signal the need
to extend the market for their properties to non-traditional users. Both of these
are negative signals to the market. The other hedonic variables are in line with
expectations.
The results from the additional location models shown in Exhibits 5 and 6 are
similar to those found in Exhibit 4. These additional models provide a robustness
check of the initial model. The REIT variable coefﬁcients are as expected as are
the ownership and hedonic variables. The location models based on the 21 sub-
market model (Exhibit 6) have the highest adjusted R2 measures of any of the
location models. The adjusted R2 measure for the occupancy models improves to
between 0.071 and 0.080 and the adjusted R2 measure for the log of rent models
improves to between 0.715 and 0.757. The REIT variable remains statistically
signiﬁcant (at the 1% and 5% levels) across the occupancy and rent models, but
the REIT variable coefﬁcients are smaller than in the prior models. The estimated
REIT coefﬁcients are 0.039, 0.044, and 0.065 for the one-, two-, and three-
bedroom models, respectively.
The empirical results support the postulate that REIT-owned apartments will
generate higher effective gross income. While the results differ from Brady and304  Hardin, Hill, and Hopper
Conlin’s (2004) study of REIT-owned lodging properties, the results from both
studies are not mutually exclusive. The management structure for lodging
properties, which emphasizes national third party property management ﬁrms,
likely minimizes the organizational structure beneﬁts that are attributable to REIT-
owned properties. By developing operating scale in local markets and developing
property level specialization and knowledge, operating results can be improved.
The REIT ownership structure provides an environment for this type of
improvement. Organizational structure characteristics and hedonic characteristics
impact operating performance.
 Conclusion
The ownership and management structures associated with real estate are shown
to impact property performance. For the multifamily rental property type, REIT-
owned properties exhibit slightly better operating performance when compared to
non-REIT-owned properties. This improved performance remains after controlling
for operating scale and branding effects. This increased operating performance
provides another reason that REITs are willing to acquire properties at slight
premiums to the prices paid by other investor groups. As an investment vehicle,
REITs can beneﬁt from increases in effective rent at the property level, as well
as previously documented cost or scale efﬁciencies. In a general sense, the
REIT ownership structure represents diversiﬁed scale operators with property
management skills. The beneﬁts are not only cost-related scale economies, but
also include revenue enhancements due to the ability to better assess market and
sub-market supply and demand and make adjustments in rent. The results imply
that the structure of property ownership impacts property performance.
Additional support is provided for the hypothesis that both organizational structure
and property-speciﬁc hedonic characteristics affect property performance. When
this research is assessed relative to other existing studies on investor clienteles,
there is an important implied additional component to the real estate investment
decision. The market players involved in a transaction may be just as important
as the location and hedonic characteristics in the determination of property rents
and cash ﬂow. Implications are related to the scale of real estate ownership, real
estate portfolio construction, property valuation, and the structure of real estate
investments.
Finally, one must be cognizant that the results from this study, similar to the results
of Brady and Conlin (2004), are from a single market. It is imperative that more
studies from additional geographic markets and property types and over different
time periods are conducted. While the existing studies provide initial support for
the effect of ownership and management structure on property performance and
returns, more research in this area is needed to conﬁrm the general application of
these constructs.Ownership Structure, Property Performance  305
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 Endnotes
1 Other examples of participant price impacts include corporate-owned residential
properties and the disposition of foreclosed properties. The focus in this case is with
owners who purchase properties for similar investment-oriented reasons.
2 The variables Local Management and Number Managed are used as exclusion restrictions
when adding the Inverse Mill’s Ratio to the SUR models. That is, Local Management
and Number Managed are used to estimate the likelihood of obtaining REIT status but
are dropped when estimating Occupancy Rate and LnRent.
3 The data are segmented by unit type as Wolverton, Hardin, and Cheng (1999) show that
the market for these unit types is a disaggregated market.
4 The sub-market indicator variables reﬂect local broker and investor deﬁnitions of the
cities various sub-markets.
5 Breusch-Pagan (1980) LM test statistics for the other models produce similar results.
That is, the SUR framework is appropriate for this dataset.
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